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Abstract—There is an ongoing debate about whether the 
Internet is like a public sphere or an echo chamber. Among 
many forms of social media, Twitter is one of the most crucial 
online places for political debate. Most of the previous studies 
focus on the formal structure of the Twitter political field, such 
as its homophilic tendency, or otherwise limits the analysis to a 
few topics. In order to explore whether Twitter functions as an 
echo chamber in general, however, we have to investigate not 
only the structure but also the contents of Twitter’s political 
field. Accordingly, we conducted both large-scale social network 
analysis and natural language processing. We firstly applied a 
community detection method to the reciprocal following 
network in Twitter and found five politically distinct 
communities in the field. We further examined dominant topics 
discussed therein by employing a topic model in analyzing the 
content of the tweets, and we found that a topic related to 
xenophobia is circulated solely in right-wing communities. To 
our knowledge, this is the first study to address echo chambers 
in Japanese Twitter political field and to examine the formal 
structure and the contents of tweets with the combination of 
large-scale social network analysis and natural language 
processing.  
Keywords–political polarization; Twitter; public sphere; echo 
chambers; topic modeling; network analysis 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
There is an ongoing debate about whether the Internet 
promotes public dialogue, thus enlarging the public sphere, or 
exacerbates the tendency for like-minded people to group 
together, thus creating echo chambers (for optimistic 
arguments, see [7][10]; for pessimistic arguments, see 
[11][22]). Social media, which are sites where ordinary people 
generate, post, and transmit their own contents, including 
political opinions and ideas, are the main research sites for the 
“public sphere or echo chamber” question. Among numerous 
social media platforms, Twitter is the one on which many 
previous studies have focused [2][5][8][9][12][14]. 
Many studies have examined the extent of homophilic 
tendencies in following networks in Twitter. This is because 
homophilic ties are considered to be “building blocks of echo 
chambers” [5]. In other words, those previous studies 
addressed the (possible) formal structure of echo chambers. 
However, the idea of echo chambers itself refers to not only 
the structure but also the content of political speech and 
dialogue. It stipulates that, in echo chambers, similar opinions 
are circulated repeatedly, leading to the reinforcement of 
existing opinions and the fragmentation of speech 
communities. Although some studies have addressed the 
contents of tweets, they only examined a narrow range of 
particular predefined topics that are reduced to a binary value 
created by human coding. In order to fully understand the 
mechanism of echo chambers, however, it is necessary to 
analyze in depth both the structure and broad contents of 
speeches circulated in the network. Here, by employing a 
combination of large-scale social network analysis and natural 
language processing, we investigated the structure and the 
contents of Twitter’s political field in Japan at the same time. 
This will shed new light on the relationship between the 
Internet and the public sphere. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Political polarization and fragmentation is a serious danger 
to a well-functioning democracy [22]. According to J.S. Mill’s 
conception of political philosophy, democracy needs a certain 
level of diversity in which citizens are exposed to a wide 
variety of ideas and opinions from fellow citizens and are 
willing to treat others as respected citizens and engage public 
dialogue with them. 
Echo chambers created by the Internet would undermine 
this possibility in a serious way. In an echo chamber situation, 
people may regard those holding different opinions as 
enemies and retreat into segregated communities. If social 
media in the Internet creates this fragmentation, it would 
endanger the foundation of our democratic societies. It 
becomes, thus, an urgent question whether social media 
promotes public sphere or creates echo chambers. We tackle 
this question by investigating the structure and the content of 
Twitter for politically engaged people in Japan. 
Twitter is a social networking service providing users the 
ability to send texts of a maximum of 140 characters to their 
followers and read texts from users they follow on Twitter (see 
[18]). In fact, Twitter users can follow any other users without 
explicit permission insofar as the accounts are not protected. 
Because of this characteristic, Twitter has more potential to be 
an open public space and well-suited for public dialogue than 
other social media, such as Facebook. 
Twitter has not only played an important role in political 
discussion online but also on “real world” politics. It is well-
known that during Arab Spring, Twitter was an effective tool 
for diffusing information and mobilizing people to the 
movements [21]. Recent social movements in various 
countries—such as the Spanish Indignados movements, the 
Occupy movement in the United States, and the Gezi 
movement in Turkey—have also employed Twitter as the 
instrumental means of communication [3][6]. On the other 
hand, Twitter also has been the subject of harsh criticisms for 
failing to manage hate speech and prevent the dissemination 
of fake news and misinformation.  
In Japan, SNS is also broadly used. According to a survey 
conducted in 2015, around 31% of the respondents use Twitter 
[19]. The proportion is slightly smaller than Facebook users 
(35.3%). However, among the younger populations (those in 
their teens and twenties), 50% are Twitter users, surpassing 
the percentage of Facebook users. 
 One of the features of Twitter is its anonymity. The same 
survey shows that around 75% of Twitter users remain 
anonymous in 2014 in Japan, which is more than twice than 
in the U.S., U.K., or Korea [20]. Anonymity can promote 
deliberative democracy because it enables minority 
populations to express their opinions without concern of being 
identified. In Japan, however, anonymity seems to harm 
democracy because it allows citizens to openly express their 
prejudice. SNS, especially Twitter, is sometimes raised as a 
reason that hate speech against foreign citizens has spread in 
recent decades [23][26].  
Internet is an effective tool for those involved in radical 
right-wing movements because it enables them to recruit new 
members cheaply and effectively [1]. Specifically, SNS 
presents one of “the most ideal platforms for sharing their own 
information, views, and communities with the masses in a 
mainstream venue virtually free of gatekeepers and oversight” 
[16]. In Japan as well, online activists of Japanese alt-right, 
called Netto Uyoku, has become one of the major social issues 
since the 2000s [24]. They are extreme nationalists who 
exhibit xenophobic attitudes toward China and North and 
South Korea in the cyber space, such as at online board 2 
channel and Twitter. Tsuji estimated that less than one percent 
of the population belong to Netto Uyoku, using results of an 
online survey [24]. Although the movement may have few 
followers at this time, their activities seem to have a strong 
impact. Many young members of the radical right-wing 
groups came to know the “hidden fact,” such as conspiracy 
theories about China and Korea, through the Internet and are 
thus motivated to join in the group [13]. According to the 
results from an online survey, more than one third of Netto 
Uyoku has Twitter accounts and use Twitter every day, which 
is more active and widespread usage compared to the general 
population [24]. The same survey found no differences 
between Netto Uyoku and the other respondents in the 
frequency of Facebook or Line usage, suggesting that radical 
right-wing groups in Japan have an affinity for Twitter.  
Is this affinity as a result of an echo chamber on Twitter 
that helps radicalize the attitudes of online activists? They 
legitimate their perspectives by associating different kinds of 
information such as news and political blogs. Through this 
web, hate-based knowledge becomes legitimate and is turned 
into web-based knowledge [16]. In Japan, hate-based tweets 
tend to be linked to the online board 2 channel as a source of 
information. It has been proved that having contact with 2 
channel strengthens racist attitudes [23][25]. Thus, Twitter 
seems to work as a tool of expanding “hate-based knowledge” 
in 2 channel to the public. If Twitter users connect only with 
those with similar political orientations, this may enhance the 
probability for them to accept the “hate-based knowledge” 
because they have few chances to examine the validity of the 
knowledge from different viewpoints. No studies exist that 
examine network structure and content of tweet at the same 
time. In light of this, it is worthwhile to explore whether 
Twitter functions as a public sphere or an echo chamber. 
III. PREVIOUS STUDIES 
We classified previous studies into two types according to 
data collection and the characteristics of analysis. 
The first type is the “entire field approach.” These studies 
are typically interested in the formal structure of the entire 
political field in Twitter and investigate whether it promotes 
echo chambers or public dialogue. These studies identify the 
entire political field in Twitter in the following way 
[2][5][8][12]. First, they search for political actors such as 
national politician, political activists, and media outlets in 
Twitter. Using their account information, they extract their 
followers’ lists corresponding to the list of politically engaged 
Twitter users. Based on this, they construct the entire field of 
the following network of politically engaged users. The 
advantage of this approach is that it covers as many politically 
engaged users as possible without the restriction of predefined 
topics or keywords. 
The political orientation for each user is inferred from the 
“following” pattern of each user or the contents of their tweets. 
In the former case, for example, users who follow Republican 
politician in the U.S. are inferred to have conservative 
orientation [5][8][12]. In a more complex case, the ideal point 
estimation is used on the basis of the information of all 
accounts the users follow [2]. In the latter case, the contents 
of tweets are used to identify users’ political orientation with 
a supervised machine-learning technique [8]. 
 
Then, researchers examine to what extent political 
homophily operates in the Twitter political field. Political 
 
Figure 1. Six Distinct Speech Communities in Japanese Twitter 
Political Field 
 
 
homophily here refers to the tendency of people linking with 
those with similar political orientation. Homophily is 
considered to be the main cause of creating the structure of 
echo chambers. The basic results converge on the conclusion 
that there is a homophilic tendency in Twitter. The detailed 
results are, however, mixed. For example, Boutyline and 
Willer reported the conservatives are more homophilic than 
liberals [5], while Colleoni and colleagues showed the 
opposite result if each user’s political orientation is identified 
from tweet contents, not just following behavior [8]. In any 
case, the main focus of Colleoni et al. is the homophilic 
structure of twitter users, not the contents of political 
discourse itself. 
The second type of previous studies focuses on restricted 
samples or singular topics. We call it the “selective approach.” 
These studies first search for the relevant users by using 
keywords or hashtag search [9][14]. For example, the users 
are identified as political engaged if they use hashtags such as 
“#democrats” or “#obama” [9], or alternatively use keywords 
in their tweets such as “Tea Party” or “Unemployment 
Benefits” [14]. Next, the network among users is constructed 
from following behaviors, Retweet (RT) behaviors, or 
mention behaviors. Finally, a cluster analysis or a community 
detection method is applied to these constructed networks. 
These clustering methods are used to examine whether users 
in their samples are segregated into different communities or 
integrated into public sphere.  
This second type of studies take into consideration not 
only the structure but also the content of tweets, in contrast 
with the “entire field approach.” Conover and colleagues 
hand-coded the tweets as liberal or conservative and found 
one-sided argument (either liberal or conservative) in each 
community in RT network [9]. Himelboim and colleagues 
took the similar procedure to demonstrate political 
homogeneity within communities in their sample [14]. 
Although their investigation of the contents of tweets would 
be one valuable step in investigating the mechanism of 
political polarization or echo chambers, the reduction of the 
contents to the binary “left” and “right” may hinder us from 
investigating its nuances. For example, it prevents us from 
asking what topics drive polarization or how differently 
distributed topics are among different communities.  
In sum, in terms of data collection, the entire field 
approach would be better than the selection approach because 
it covers politically engaged people in a given area more 
effectively. However, previous studies of this approach 
seldom considered the content of political tweets. On the other 
hand, the studies addressing the content of speech usually take 
the restricted or selective approach to collect the relevant data. 
Furthermore, the tweet contents they examine are severely 
reduced to the simple binary value based on predetermined 
coding scheme. 
Here we adopted the entire field approach and at the same 
time analyze the rich content of the tweets. Furthermore, we 
tried to avoid reducing the content of tweets to simple values 
(left–right). Specifically, we applied topic model to the 
contents of tweets, which allowed us to preserve the contents 
of tweets as much as possible while making them suitable for 
quantitative analysis. 
Our research questions are as follows.  
First, is the entire political field in Japanese Twitter 
differentiated into distinct political speech communities or 
does it rather have the integrative structure? In order to answer 
this question, we adopted the inductive method, that is, we 
applied a community detection method to the field, enabling 
us to inductively find the divided lines in the field. This 
method is more suitable for Japanese political field because, 
unlike the U.S. and other countries, it may not have clear-cut 
left–right division. Thus, this approach offers the potential to 
reveal multiple divided lines that are difficult to define a priori.  
Second, if there are different communities in Twitter’s 
political field, do those communities function as echo 
chambers or do they frequently communicate with each other? 
We examined the extent of echo chambers by looking at how 
much difference there are in terms of topics discussed by 
members. If a certain topic is discussed in exclusively a sole 
community, it would be concluded that the community 
functions as an echo chamber. On the other hand, if several 
topics are discussed to equal or similar extent among different 
communities, polarization is not as serious even if there are 
different speech communities in the Twitter political field. 
 
IV. DATA 
The data collection was done through Twitter REST API, 
from March 2017 through May 2017. 
We adopted the entire field approach in collecting Twitter data. 
We tried to cover the Japanese Twitter political field as much 
as possible, which is defined as the sphere where politically 
engaged people exchange their ideas and opinions. 
Specifically, we gathered the data in the following way. First, 
we searched for the accounts of political party leaders in 
Japanese national politics in April 2017 (as for the “Nippon 
no Kokoro” party, we used the party official account because 
the leader has no personal account). Nine accounts of eight 
political parties (Liberal Party had two joint representative) 
were found. Then, by using the information on followers for 
each political leader, we identified politically engaged people 
as those who followed at least one of the political party leaders. 
The information regarding which political leaders each user 
follows, in turn, was used to specify his or her political 
orientation. Furthermore, we focused on the followers of the 
political leaders whose Twitter accounts were unprotected, 
had more than 500 followers, tweeted more than 1000 times, 
and posted at least one tweet in 2017. The total number of 
users was 92,313. This restriction was necessary for data 
manageability but also had a theoretical justification. By 
doing this, we can exclude bots and inactive users and focus 
on moderate opinion leaders who share political information, 
exchange political opinions, and engage in political dialogue. 
Next, we gathered followers’ data, including screen name, 
friends/followers list, profile description, and other 
information, through Twitter REST API (hereinafter “user 
data”). The friends/followers lists were used to construct the 
following network among the users in the Japanese Twitter 
political field, and the profile description was employed to 
identify users’ political, social, and cultural orientation. 
We also collected the tweet content data, which consisted 
of every user’s latest tweets (due to API’s constraints, the 
maximum number of tweets we could collect were the last 
3200 tweets). This text data was preprocessed and used as the 
corpus for topic modeling. 
 
V. METHOD 
Regarding network construction, we focused on a kind of 
reciprocal following network. Generally, following relation is 
not necessarily reciprocated in Twitter. Users are allowed to 
follow other users in one-way direction without permission. 
The difference between one-way following network and 
reciprocal following network in Twitter, as a previous study 
suggests, is that the former reflects the characteristics of a 
“newsy” media while reciprocal following networks better 
captures the aspect of social media in Twitter [18]. Since we 
are mainly interested in whether Twitter as a social media 
functions as public sphere, we restricted our analysis to a 
reciprocal following network in the following analysis. 
 The reciprocal following network was constructed based 
on user data, which contains follower/friends (following) lists. 
For example, the edge between user A and user B should be 
added if user A followed user B and user B also followed user 
A.  
 Then, we applied The Louvain method—one type of 
modularity-based community detection methods—to this 
network in order to obtain community partition in the Twitter 
political field. Modularity measures the density of edges 
within communities compared to edges between communities. 
The Louvain method is a fast heuristic algorithm for finding 
community partition to optimize modularity in a large 
network. Sociologically, each community detected by the 
method corresponds to a relatively cohesive speech 
community in the field. We used the NetworkX library in 
Python for the implementation of community detection 
algorithm. 
Next, we applied Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [4], 
to the tweet content data. LDA is a standard type of topic 
models. Here each document is allowed to have mixture of 
topics and each topic, which means a set of probability 
distribution over vocabularies in the corpus, is assigned to 
each document probabilistically. Thus, each document is 
characterized by the topic proportion assigned to it.  
  Before implementing a topic model, we preprocessed the 
tweet data by applying morphological analysis to identify the 
unit of Japanese words and removing stop words. We also 
converted the texts into 1-gram bag of words. For documents, 
we merged all tweets posted by the same user into one 
document because one tweet contains only a maximum of 140 
characters, making it difficult to appropriately assign it to a 
particular topic.  
It has been reported that pooling all tweets by the same user 
into one document improves the precision of topic assignment 
[15]. This yielded the complete data sample: 79,536 
documents, 125,745 vocabularies, and 402,640,579 tokens. 
After these preprocessing, we applied LDA to the data and 
implemented parallelized Latent Dirichlet Allocation by 
genism in Python library. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE I.  SIZE AND FOLLOW RATIO FOR EACH PARTY LEADER OF COMMUNITIES
 
Community Size 
Follow ratio 
Shinzo Abe 
(LDP) 
Ichiro Matsui 
(JRP) 
Mizuho 
Fukushima 
(SDP) 
Nippon no 
Kokoro 
Ichiro Ozawa 
(LP) 
Renho 
(DPJ) 
Kazuo Shii 
(JCP) 
Natsuo 
Yamaguchi 
(KOMEI) 
Taro 
Yamamoto 
(LP) 
0: Abe (LDP) 
follower 16,559 0.74 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.22 0.04 0.01 0.09 
1: Right-wing 
follower 8,871 0.87 0.20 0.12 0.53 0.07 0.13 0.06 0.02 0.07 
2: Renho (DPJ) 
follower 40,241 0.37 0.07 0.20 0.02 0.14 0.50 0.07 0.01 0.27 
3: Left-wing 
follower 12,012 0.16 0.05 0.54 0.02 0.48 0.32 0.43 0.02 0.66 
4: Yamamoto 
follower 4,998 0.23 0.03 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.17 0.11 0.00 0.58 
5: JRP and ruling 
party 606 0.68 0.63 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.21 0.08 0.23 0.09 
Base line follow 
ratio   0.49 0.08 0.20 0.07 0.16 0.34 0.11 0.01 0.27 
    
TABLE II.  TOPIC DISTRIBUTIONS FOR EACH COMMUNITY 
Topic 12: Idol 24: Anime 34: Xenophobia 17: Cuisine 
40: Conspiracy law, 
Moritomo Gakuen 
scandal 
29: Music 
36: the mixed 
topic (Nuclear 
power plant and 
JRP) 
Associated words 
生誕祭 (Birthday 
party) 
入荷 (Arrival of 
goods) 民主党 (DPJ) ワイン (Wine) 
森友学園(Moritomo 
Gakuen) バンド (Band) 
自民党 (Liberal 
Democratic 
Party) 
うれし涙(Happy 
tears) 
けものフレンズ
(Title of Anime) 蓮舫（Renho） 講座 (Seminar) 国会 (Congress) 
アーティスト
(Artist) 
脱原発 
(Abandoning 
nuclear power) 
泣き顔(Crying 
face) 
艦これ(Title of 
Anime) 
在日 (Korean 
Japanese) 香り (Aroma) 
自民党 
(Liberal Democratic 
Party) 
アルバム 
(Album) 
維新 (Japan 
Restoration 
Party) 
好きな人 (A 
person I love) 抽選(Lot) 韓国人(Korean) ご飯 (Rice) 
安倍 (Prime 
minister) 
公演 
(Performance) 稼働 (Operation) 
音符 (Music 
note) 
送料(Mailing 
cost) 反日(Anti-Japan) レシピ (Recipe) 
共謀罪 (Conspirary 
law) 
不動産 (real 
estate) 国会 (Congress) 
0: Abe 0.23 0.15 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 
1: Right-wing 0.02 0.02 0.57 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.02 
2: Renho 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.17 0.01 0.06 0.02 
3: Left-wing 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.39 0.02 0.18 
4: Yamamoto 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.02 0.57 0.01 
5: JRP and ruling 
party 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.45 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of Topics for Each Community 
VI. RESULTS 
First, we applied Louvain methods to the analysis of the 
reciprocal following network (the number of nodes of which 
was 87,215 and the number of edges was 6,745,449). The 
network was partitioned into 113 distinct communities. We 
excluded the nodes that belong to the community (a) whose 
members are too few, (b) whose members are largely from 
foreign countries, or (c) whose members are bots1. This gave 
us six distinct communities.  
Figure 1 shows the result of network visualization. (We 
only visualized the network of the users with more than 5000 
followers. Visualization was done by Gephi.) The size of each 
community is shown in the second column of Table 1. 
Next, in order to specify political orientation that 
characterized each community, we calculated the probability 
of following a political leader for each community member. 
Table I summarizes the results, which show that the patterns 
of following political leaders are differentiated among distinct 
communities. Community 0 largely consists of those who 
follow Shinzo Abe, the leader of Liberal Democratic Party, 
which is Japan’s ruling party with conservative ideology. The 
ratio of Abe followers is 0.74. Community 1 is characterized 
as right-wing followers because more than half of the 
members follow the “Nippon no Kokoro” account, which is 
the rightist party in Japanese national politics. We will call this 
community right-wing followers community. Community 2 is 
characterized as Democratic Party in Japan (DPJ) followers, 
as the half of members follow Renho, who was the leader of 
DPJ at the time of data collection. Community 3 is left-wing 
followers, because members follow left-wing party leaders 
such as Mizuho Fukushima, the leader of Social Democratic 
Party, and Kazuo Shii, the leader of Japan Communist Party. 
The majority of Community 4 follow Taro Yamamoto, 
conjoint representative of Liberal Party. He is an activist for 
anti-nuclear power movement and a well-known actor in 
theater, cinema, and TV drama. We inferred from the profile 
description (the result is not shown) and the topic ratio below 
that members of Community 3 focus on his activity in the anti-
nuclear power movement, whereas members of Community 4 
are interested in him as a famous actor. Community 5 consists 
of followers of Ichiro Matsui, the leader of Japan Restoration 
Party, and Natsuo Yamaguchi, the leader of KOMEI party, 
which is the other ruling party at the time of data collection. 
The next step was to investigate whether each community 
discusses different topics or shares a common interest across 
                                                            
1 We disregarded the communities with less than 10 
members. We judged whether the accounts are from foreign 
countries and whether they are bots from the contents of 
tweets and profile descriptions. 
2 This point may partly depend on the number of topics. For 
instance, when the number of topics is set to be 70, the issue 
related to conspiracy law and the Moritomo Gakuen scandal 
is differentiated into two different topics. In this case, one 
topic, Moritomo Gakuen scandal, is shared among different 
communities and the other, conspiracy law, is dominantly 
discussed about solely by the left-wing follower community. 
communities, by examining the overall topic distribution in 
each community.  
We applied a topic model to our tweets contents corpus. We 
set the number of topics to be 50 for topic interpretability. We 
tried the different number of topics (30, 40, 60, 70, 80) and 
found the results were qualitatively similar. Some of the 
resulting topics are shown in Table II. 
To answer the question of how differently distributed the 
topics are among distinct communities, we examined the topic 
proportion in each community and found that some speech 
communities are characterized by a few dominant topics. 
Figure 2 shows the part of the result. The most salient is 
that members of the right-wing follower community use a set 
of words that express xenophobia (Topic 34) much more often 
than others. This topic accounts for 57% of the topics in the 
right-wing follower community but only for a maximum of 
6% in other communities. A similar, but less extreme 
tendency is found in the left-wing follower community. The 
members in this community show great interest in conspiracy 
law and the Moritomo Gakuen scandal, which topics garner 
much less attention in other communities2.  
The Abe-following community and Renho-following 
community are characterized by a relatively even topic 
proportion and more mundane topics. Although the interest in 
Yamamoto community is exclusively focused on music, this 
should not be interpreted as the symptom of echo chambers. 
Rather, the members of this community may only have an 
interest in Yamamoto as an actor, not politician, thus making 
this community relatively distinct from other communities in 
this political field. Finally, JRP and the ruling-party follower 
community shows their interest in JRP related issues3. 
 In summary, we found six major communities in the 
Twitter political field in Japan that are distinct from each other 
in the pattern of following political leaders. Topic analysis 
revealed topic polarization, especially among right-wing 
followers, whose speeches were characterized by xenophobia 
and might be echo-chambered within their community 
without exposure of counterarguments from other 
communities.  The left-wing community also shows similar 
tendency, although the dialogue is more open than in the right-
wing follower community. 
VII DISCUSSION 
In this study, we tried to answer the question of whether 
there are distinct political speech communities in Japanese 
Twitter political field. Because there would be more than 
However, there remains the tendency that speech 
communities discussed about a few idiosyncratic issues 
which are not shared by other communities. 
3 Although the topic analysis with 50 topics failed to 
differentiate the content of the “mixed topic”, word 
frequency analysis and topic analysis with the different 
number of topics revealed the following fact (results are not 
shown); JRP and the ruling-party community showed 
interest in JPP related issues such as Osaka metropolis plan 
while the nuclear plant problems are exclusively discussed 
by the left-wing follower community.   
simply two camps of political ideologies (i.e., left and right), 
we adopted the inductive approach to see whether political 
distinct communities emerged in a bottom-up way through 
community detection rather than imposing predefined 
political categories. We found six distinct communities in the 
field that reflect a wide variety of political ideological 
positions in Japan. Very roughly speaking, Community 3 can 
be positioned on the leftmost side, Community 2 on the 
middle left, Community 0 on the middle right, and 
Community 1 on the rightmost side. Community 5 is difficult 
to position on the left–right scale. Community 4 may consist 
of less politically engaged people than others. Our inductive 
methods may be useful for Twitter political fields comprising 
multiple political positions that are difficult to be reduced to a 
simple left–right scheme. 
Furthermore, Community 1 is composed of around 10% 
of the total nodes, which is much larger than the estimated size 
of Netto Uyoku (0.1% in [24]). Of course, we limited our 
sample to moderate opinion leaders who are willing to share 
political information, exchange political opinions, and engage 
in political dialogue. Characteristics of our sample are not 
equal to Netto Uyoku even though writing about political issue 
on an online board is one feature of the group. However, at 
least when it comes to moderate opinion leaders, proportions 
of those in radical right community are not so small. This is a 
finding with serious implications because the moderate 
leaders in our sample all have more than 500 followers each, 
who read hate speech daily in their Twitter feed and may be 
influenced by these tweets. 
Furthermore, we found that each community discusses 
different issues that rarely overlap. Right-wing followers write 
about Korea, Korean Japanese, and dual nationality issues. 
Left-wing followers write about conspiracy law and the 
corruption of the government. Because of their differing 
interests, there is little debate over these issues across 
community lines. Our results suggest that whether an echo 
chamber occurs in Twitter depends on the topic. 
Our finding about the relationship between echo chambers 
and political ideologies is consistent with previous studies in 
spite of the difference in methodologies. Boutyline and Willer 
found that both more extreme and more conservative 
individuals are likely to form homophilic ties than more 
liberal and more moderate ones [5]. This finding is supported 
by the analysis of the formal structure of the Twitter field. Our 
finding complements this by examining the tweet contents, 
which analysis found that the extreme conservative 
community has the strongest tendency to circulate one 
exclusive topic within it; to a lesser degree, the leftist 
community also focuses on a few of topics more than the 
moderate ideology community. 
Furthermore, our method contributes to the understanding 
of what kinds of topics are likely to be circulated within each 
speech community. Our result suggests that xenophobic 
speeches tend to circulate only within one idiosyncratic 
community. This is probably because the members in other 
communities hesitate to discuss or even refer to such topics. 
We should add that this does not justify the circulation of hate 
speech in Twitter because people can be exposed to such 
speeches even if they do not participate in the discussion or 
refer to them.  
To our knowledge, this is the first study to address echo 
chamber issues in Japanese Twitter political field by 
examining the formal structure and the rich contents of tweets 
with the combination of large-scale social network analysis 
and natural language processing. We believe this method can 
be extended to the Twitter field or other social media analysis 
in other countries. In future work, it will be interesting to 
conduct an international comparison of the mechanism of 
political polarization with our method. 
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